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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR CAMP:1 THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERSIGHT
LESLIE BOOK
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Camp’s article is a welcome addition to the growing scholarship
addressing tax procedure generally,2 and issues revolving around tax collection in
particular.3 Revolving around the useful paradigm of can’t versus won’t pay as the
critical focal point of the collection process, Professor Camp believes Collection Due
Process (CDP) to be a failure. The essential insight of Professor Camp’s work, both here,
and in prior articles,4 is its highlighting that the IRS makes millions of collection
determinations, many essentially automated and devoid of human touch. IRS collection
efforts focus on separating those taxpayers who can’t pay their liabilities due to hardship,
from those who simply won’t, due to procrastination or the decision to favor other
creditors or purchase non-essential goods and services, instead of fulfilling their
obligations to the fisc. In doing so, Camp skillfully places IRS collection actions within
the magnitude of the largely automated tax collection process. He argues that CDP’s
notice requirements, its giving taxpayers a statutorily-created administrative hearing
1

Bryan Camp, The Problem of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 83 IND. L. J. ### (2008)
[hereinafter Camp, Adversarial Process]. The author is grateful for the tireless and enthusiastic assistance
of John Brian Hudson (VLS 2010), and the financial support of the Villanova University School of Law.
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rights and its interjecting the possibility of judicial review for a broad range of collection
determinations is not helpful for taxpayers or tax administration, especially in light of the
bulk process that characterizes much of the IRS’s task in tax collection.
While much of Professor Camp’s argument is persuasive, it comes up short both
as a descriptive and prescriptive model. Unquestionably, the IRS’s collection process
borrows heavily from inquisitorial models of agency action, and given the information
asymmetry between the IRS and taxpayers themselves, the agency faces heavy obstacles
to consider whether delinquent taxpayers fall within the can’t- or won’t-pay category. But
those insights are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of the entire collection process,
which is best thought of as involving a range of interests meriting differing levels of
procedural protection and personal IRS intervention. In this brief response, I situate IRS
collection determinations within the broader landscape of administrative law, highlight
the principles that administrative law scholars have emphasized in considering what is
fair agency practice, and apply those principles to the collection context. I conclude that
Professor Camp rightfully highlights some of CDP’s problems, but misses its benefits
and thus fails in prescribing the repeal of CDP. Yet, Professor Camp’s article is a
significant achievement for those considering tax collection. Its targeting of CDP’s
shortfalls highlights some of the problems of the legislative process, and allows us to
consider how Congress and the IRS can improve collection rights without sacrificing
essential efficiency concerns associated with collecting taxes.
II. THE CONNECTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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Most IRS collection actions – even automatic decisions to send correspondence in
light of assessed liabilities – are informal adjudications in administrative law parlance.5
The Administrative Procedure Act6 (APA) only provides for defined procedural
protections for formal adjudication.7 Administrative agencies perform two basic
functions: adjudication and rulemaking. Though intended to have “distinct procedural
consequences,” the APA does not clearly distinguish the two through their respective
definitions. When performing their adjudicatory role, the agency is making
determinations in “administering a program made up of general rules – statutory, judicial,
or administrative” – essentially applying rules to individual circumstances.8 In
performing this adjudicatory role, the agency engages in both formal adjudications –
where procedural protections apply – and informal adjudications – where protections do
not.9 Formal adjudications are those matters where the agency is required to keep a
record, and the term “informal adjudication” is sort of a catch-all for everything else.10
This situates IRS collection actions, such as sending notices, the ministerial act of
assessing the liability as adjudications in administrative law parlance. As Professor
Morrison has identified, “every agency action, including such mundane matters as
granting, or denying, a pass to enter a government building, [or] ordering a carton of
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Gordon Young, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 184 (1996) (“The APA’s differentiation between adjudicative
and legislative [rulemaking] action has proved intelligible only by means of reading common sense and
constitutional tradition into the statute.”). In essence, the rulemaking role that administrative agencies play
is similar to a legislative body, promulgating rules, procedures, and standards applicable to both the agency
and those it regulates. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 469, 483-87 (2000). Though not using the term, the only section of the APA applicable to informal
adjudications is “Ancillary Matters.” 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2000).
6
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
7
The only section of the APA that at all applies to informal adjudications is “Ancillary Matters.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 555 (2000).
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Koch, supra note 5, at 471-72.
9
Allan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts – Except When
They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 98 (2007).
10
Id.
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toilet paper . . . culminates in an “order” under the APA, the proceeding leading to it is an
adjudication.”11
Merely placing IRS actions within the landscape of broader administrative law, or
the APA itself, does not in and of itself provide policymakers with sufficient guidance
regarding how much procedural protection should attach to various stages of the IRS’s
collection process.12 The APA prescribes procedural protections only for formal
adjudications, and affords no such protections for informal adjudications Administrative
law scholars have bemoaned the black hole associated with procedural protections that
should attach to these, and a recent ABA report by Professor Michael Asimow13 proposes
minimum procedural protections for this range of agency actions
There is significant disagreement among administrative law scholars as to the
extent of procedural protections, and type of actions which generate meaningful
procedural protections. The task of considering whether and to what extent agency

11

Id.
Administrative law scholars have bemoaned how informal adjudications fall within the black hole of
administrative law. The APA provides little in the way of guidance as to how the agency should conduct
these adjudications, and the Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee, declined to impose judicially imposed
minimum procedural decisions for informal agency action. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (“In short, nothing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances
of this case, the nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate under
which the Commission operates permit[s] the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on
the basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long as the
Commission employed the statutory minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case.”). See
also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 742
(1990).
13
See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication Provisions to All
Evidentiary Hearings Required By Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003 (2004). Asimow’s piece was part of
an entire symposium in the Administrative Law Review on what to do with informal adjudications. See
e.g. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail that Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN L. REV. 1057 (2004). Professor Krotoszynski is skeptical of the ex ante
effects that judicial review has on agency practice. Id. at 1073 (“[E]stablishing a broader, generally
applicable set of procedures that would open up virtually all agency decisionmaking to interested persons
would probably create more problems than it would solve. A broader, generalized right of participation in
all informal adjudications would be impractical, unnecessary, and unjustified on cost-benefit grounds.”)
Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., Restoring the Applicability of the APA’s Adjudicatory Procedures, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1043 (2004).
12
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actions generate protections is helped by situating the agency’s actions within the
underlying principles of administrative law. As I have previously discussed,
administrative law is defined, in part, by two often inconsistent principles: efficiency and
fidelity to rule of law principles.14 Concern with efficiency reflects a desire to allow
agencies to use their expertise,15 and is highlighted by the broadest possible deference to
agency decisions, and even their possible exclusion from judicial review.16 On the other
hand, there is a longstanding concern that agencies, with too much power and acting
outside the possibility of court review, can improperly disregard individual interest. This
latter concern has prompted deep-seated presumptions in favor of judicial review of
particularized agency decisions that affect individual’s property or liberty interests.17 The
presumption of judicial review of agency action is
an integral part of the American checks and balances system–a powerful deterrent
to abuses of power and an effective remedy when abuses occur. By helping
maintain public confidence that government officials remain subject to the rule of
law, judicial review also bolsters the legitimacy of agency action. . . . Finally,

14

See Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1145 (2004) [hereinafter Book, CDP Rights] (discussing the “competing policy concerns” of
efficiency and preservation of the rule of law in administrative decision-making); Leslie Book, CDP and
Collections: Perceptions and Misperceptions, TAX NOTES, April 25, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 79-42.
15
Book, CDP Rights, supra note 14, at 1167; Koch, supra note 5 at 473 (“Restrained judicial review
protects the courts from the burden of actively supervising the mass of individualizing decisions and
protects the agencies, which would find it difficult to administer these programs if their individual
decisions were frequently subjected to close judicial scrutiny.").
16
See Book, CDP Rights, supra note 14, at 1173-75 (discussing tax litigation’s place outside the
administrative law mainstream in terms of judicial review of agency action); Koch, supra note 5, at 478
(“Whether a particular exercise of individualizing discretion warrants direct judicial involvement is a
difficult threshold choice for a court. In deciding to review a specific individualizing decision, courts
should not be criticized as long as they are highly selective in choosing to do so.” (emphasis supplied)).
17
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a StandardsBased Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 499, 501 (2005) (“[W]henever government officials
make decisions involving the application of legal standards, the rule of law – and hence the rule of law
safeguards of due process and judicial review – attaches.”); Koch supra note 5, at 493 (“The threshold
question for the court is always whether the agency correctly applied the law. Courts are the final arbiters
of questions of law, and hence their review of this threshold question demands that they agree with the
legal conclusions of the agency. They can substitute their judgment for a legal conclusion with which they
disagree.”).
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judicial review can enhance the quality of administrative action by exposing
partiality, carelessness, and perverseness in agencies’ reasoning.18
These principles are helpful guideposts, but calibrating the extent of procedural
protections for the broad category of informal agency adjudications has been a challenge
to administrative law scholars. In surveying the administrative law landscape where
agency adjudications escaped review, Professor Koch emphasizes that there should be a
strong preference against unbridled agency discretion, and advises that unreviewability
should generally be limited to issues of expediency.19 In effect, Professor Camp’s
arguments revolve around expediency and efficiency, and are based on both a notion that
CDP’s protections are at best minimally beneficial to taxpayers, and cause the IRS to less
efficiently manage its millions of delinquent collection accounts. To that end, Professor
Camp skillfully describes how CDP allows for determinations in only the loosest sense of
the word. These determinations involve little human interaction, and Professor Camp’s
article sets out nicely how the automated aspects of most of the tax collection process
affords little discretion or judgment.20 He makes a strong case for the futility of
interposing judicial review for much of the collection process, especially given the sheer
number of collection accounts in an annual period.
Again, considering the IRS as an administrative agency that is part of a broader
administrative law landscape is helpful in gauging how much procedural protection
should attach throughout the collection process. Professor Koch discusses individualized
discretion as a concept surrounding the actions that agencies make when administering a
18

Levin, supra note 12, at 742 (footnotes omitted).
Koch, supra note 5, at 502 (“[T]here is very little good about unbridled discretion – it is at best a
necessary evil brought about by such expediencies as the need to end the process or save resources for
more important decisions. Therefore, the law should incorporate a very strong preference against its
proliferation. . . .”).
20
See Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 17-24.
19
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program that is made up of statutory, regulatory, or administrative rules.21 Professor
Verkuil advises that fairness, efficiency and satisfaction are the hallmarks of a
fundamentally fair administrative process.22 As Professor Krotoszynski observes, these
values should help shape agency practice.23 While mundane agency decisions – like how
high an agency should set its thermometer in agency office buildings24 -- constitutes
informal agency adjudication in the technical sense, few would worry about setting
process rights revolving around this type of agency determination. Professor Camp’s
arguments borrow heavily from the insights of Judge Friendly, who rightly emphasized
the costs associated with imparting judicial review of individualized mass justice
systems.25 Yet the types of agency decisions that warrant greater concern with levels of
procedural protections include cases that involve an “individual, concrete, and
particularized interest.” 26 As Professor Davis emphasized, judicial review is an
appropriate avenue to keep an individual from being exposed to the “uncontrolled and
arbitrary action of a public administrative officer.”27
It is useful to think of agency decisions in general and IRS decisions in particular
as arising on a spectrum, with decisions that reflect a greater need for fidelity to
efficiency and expediency on one end and those with a greater need for fairness and
satisfaction that generally are associated with heightened procedural safeguards on the

21

Koch, supra note 5, at 471-72.
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279-80
(1978).
23
Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 1071.
24
Id. at 1072.
25
Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 49. See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1967).
26
Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 1073. See also Richard E. Levy & Sidney A Shapiro, Government
Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev.
499 (2006) (urging that judicial review is appropriate in cases concerning government benefits).
27
See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28:1, 28:7 (2d ed. 1984).
22
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other.28 Just where agency decisions fall on this spectrum evolves over time, as
individuals’ expectations of procedural regularity have increased over the last century.29
For example, the substantial pre-assessment administrative and judicial review rights that
taxpayers now enjoy were not part of the income tax system as originally proposed,30 and
the tax system’s increasing emphasis on increased individual rights mirrors society’s
generalized expectations for additional procedural protections in light of government
actions that could affect individuals’ property rights.
Professor Camp argues that CDP gives additional procedural rights at a point in
time where many individuals do not necessarily raise, or are incapable of raising,
particularized individual interests. Pointing to the bulk processing aspect of collection,
and the millions of annual collection notices that trigger CDP review, Camp questions
how CDP adds value to collection decisions that largely revolve around the government’s
legitimate task of ferreting out the can’t- from the won’t-pays.31
Yet the argument that CDP is over inclusive misses the particularized interests
that individuals have in the collection process. For example, IRS decisions with respect to
28

See Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 264 (2004) (“The satisfaction
interpretation of the participation model uses participant satisfaction as the criteria for the evaluation of
process.”); R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal
Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1988) (citing the opportunity for error correction as an essential
factor in citizen satisfaction with procedures).
29
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 80-91 (1985) (arguing that Americans increasingly expect
all government actions that affect individuals to conform to notions of fair procedure).
30
Before CDP, the IRS could automatically place a lien on all of the taxpayer’s property or rights to
property following nonpayment or a deficiency determination. If the taxpayer then refuses to pay the tax
liability, the IRS could use their levy power – a provisional remedy, as it does not determine whether or not
the taxpayer actually owes the underlying liability or whether a third party has a superior interest to the
property – to collect, allowing the government the right to seize and dispose of property before such a
determination is made. However, now when a lien is placed on a taxpayer’s property, they are entitled to
notice and have the right for a CDP hearing before any action may be taken. For a discussion of the
changes made to the income tax system with the advent of CDP, see Book, CDP Rights, supra note 14, at
1150-56.
31
Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 67 (“The dynamic nature of the classification decisions and
the high-volume automated nature of the collection process are perhaps the most important reasons why
adversarial judicial review adds no value to this branch of tax administration.”).
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collection alternatives raise individual particularized taxpayer interests. As Professor
Camp describes, the three main collection alternatives are: (1) Installment Agreements,
where the taxpayer pays the liability in full plus interest over time; (2) Offers-inCompromise (OICs), where the IRS absolves a taxpayer of a certain portion of the
liability, and the taxpayer pays back an agreed-upon amount at once or over time; and (3)
Currently-Not-Collectible (CNC) status, where the tax debt remains, but the IRS agrees
to hold off collection action.32 CDP has created a hybrid world for collection alternatives.
Generally, IRS determinations about collection alternatives are and have been exempt
from court review. CDP changed that in one important respect: if a taxpayer raises a
collection alternative in a CDP hearing, the agency determination is subject to abuse of
discretion review based upon the record created in the Appeals CDP hearing.33 So CDP
has opened the door, albeit slightly, for judicial review of these determinations – but only
if the taxpayer raises the collection alternative in the CDP hearing – and court review is
generally limited to consideration of whether the IRS abused its discretion based upon the
record before it when it made its decision.
One of Professor Camp’s main criticisms of judicial review of collection
determinations is that the collection process is dynamic, dependent upon the taxpayer’s
ever changing financial circumstances.34 But this is not true as a descriptive matter with
respect to collection alternatives in general and offers in compromise in particular. Rather
than a dynamic event, the IRS is required to consider a taxpayer’s request for a collection
alternative based upon the taxpayer’s facts when he submits those to the IRS. Consider
32

Id. at 13.
When the underlying tax liability is at issue, the IRS’s determination will be reviewed de novo.
However, when the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the Tax Court will review the IRS’s
determination on an abuse of discretion basis. Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000).
34
See Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 67-72.

33
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offers in compromise based upon doubt as to collectability. In those offers, the IRS is
authorized to accept an offer to settle an outstanding tax liability, and the IRS generally
accepts offers if the taxpayer’s offer amount equals or exceeds his reasonable collection
potential (RCP).35 RCP is based upon a consideration of equity in assets and a monetized
present value of the excess of the taxpayer’s income over necessary expenses.36 The IRS
evaluates these offers based upon a snapshot of the taxpayer’s financial condition. To
take into account a possible future change in circumstances, the IRS is authorized to enter
into collateral agreements that can result in future payments to the IRS.37 Absent a
collateral agreement, and assuming the taxpayer remains in compliance for a period after
the offer’s acceptance,38 the taxpayer’s future circumstances are irrelevant insofar as the
offer.39
While a taxpayer may submit future requests for collection alternatives if an
initial request is denied or not processed, that future right does not alter the nature of the
IRS’s function with respect to the initial consideration. Over time, Congress has
expressed a strong interest in formalizing the offer process, and effectively required the
IRS to apply its detailed standards to the taxpayer’s facts and circumstances. To fit in
consideration of offers into his bulk processing model, Professor Camp minimizes the

35

See 26 C.F.R. § 601.203 (2008).
See I.R.M. 5.8.5.
37
A collateral agreement enables the government to collect funds in addition to the amount actually secured
by the offer or to add additional terms not included in the standard Form 656 agreement, thereby recouping
part or all of the difference between the amount of the offer or additional terms of the offer and the liability
compromised. I.R.M. 5.8.6.1.
38
A taxpayer who has had an OIC accepted must remain in compliance with federal tax filing and payment
requirements for five years or the duration of the OIC, whichever is longer. I.R.M. 5.19.7.3.26.5(1) (Dec.
5, 2006).
39
This works to the advantage of some taxpayers, who may have improved their financial circumstances
following either submission or acceptance of the offer, but in other situations, works to the IRS’s
advantage, as in some situations the taxpayer’s RCP declines.
36
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individual application of standards to taxpayers’ circumstances in offers.40 While the IRS
has promulgated standards and caps to help the IRS (and taxpayers) compute collection
potential, with the exception of an allowance for expenses associated with food, clothing
and some miscellaneous items, some of the expenses must be tied to actual
expenditures.41 Moreover, Congress emphasized the individualized nature of offer
determinations,42 and in RRA 98 Congress formalized some of the rules with respect to
offers.43 In addition, Congress also provided that the IRS is not allowed to reject an offer
from a low-income taxpayer just because the offer amount is low.44 IRS and Treasury
expanded upon this statutory right, providing that this no minimum offer rule applies to
all taxpayers – not just low income taxpayers.45
Of course, the IRS is free to administer programs like collection alternatives in a
manner that it deems appropriate. In fact, following RRA 98, the IRS has taken many
steps to make the offer process more efficient, including creating a centralized review
40

See Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 25 (characterizing evaluation criteria for OICs as
“aggregate” or “bulk” as opposed to individualized).
41
“Taxpayers are allowed the total National Standards amount monthly for their family size, without
questioning the amounts they actually spend. If the amount claimed is more than the total allowed by the
National Standards, the taxpayer must provide documentation to substantiate those expenses are necessary
living expenses. Generally, the total number of persons allowed for National Standards should be the same
as those allowed as exemptions on the taxpayer’s most recent year income tax return.” Internal Revenue
Serv., National Standards: Food, Clothing and Other Items,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104627,00.html. The IRS also allows taxpayers a
minimum amount of health care expenses regardless of actual expenses, but allowable transportation and
housing expenses are based on actual expenditures, which must be documented and are subject to
limitations based on family size and location. See Internal Revenue Serv., Collection Financial Standards,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html.
42
S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 89 (1998) (“The IRS will also be required to consider the facts and
circumstances of a particular taxpayer’s case in determining whether the national and local schedules are
adequate for that particular taxpayer. If the facts indicate that use of scheduled allowances would be
inadequate under the circumstances, the taxpayer would not be limited by the national or local
allowances.”).
43
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-174, § 509 (1998).
44
S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 89 (1998). This latter change reflects Congressional desire to consider the
individualized circumstances of offers, and again highlights the need for individualized determinations that
reflect agency creation of applicable standards and agency application of those standards to individuals in a
manner inconsistent with the bulk processing nature of the collection stream that Professor Camp describes.
45
Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(3) (2002).
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process for offers and removing most offer requests from field consideration.46 These
steps are reflective of the agency’s deep-seated concern for efficiency and expediency
when it comes to actions, a concern with even greater pedigree when it comes to tax
collection.
This statutory requirement that the IRS not reject offers solely on the amount of
the offer reflects Congressional concern that prior to RRA 98 the IRS was not
considering the individual merits of particular offers,47 and is an explicit rejection of the
broad discretionless approach to tax collection that Professor Camp describes. It is not
that Professor Camp’s description is wrong; it is just incomplete. While much of the
collection process does not rely in any way on individualized determinations, by their
definition, collection alternatives, and offers in compromise in particular, require that the
IRS consider the circumstances of the taxpayer submitting the requests for alternatives to
enforced collection, and apply standards to those individualized circumstances. It is of
course possible for either Congress to legislate or the IRS to administer the law to remove
discretion from the consideration—in fact, both have done so when it comes to certain
installment agreement requests, where taxpayers in effect have an automatic right to
agree to pay those agreements in certain defined circumstances.48

46

See Gov’t Accountability Office, IRS Offers in Compromise: Performance Has Been Mixed; Better
Management Information and Simplification Could Improve the Program 7 (April, 2006) (describing the
centralization of OIC review); 2007 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report to Con. 376-81 (arguing that
the new OIC rules may actually be making it harder for taxpayers to submit OICs).
47
See S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 88-89 (discussing the desire for the IRS to be flexible in dealing with
taxpayers who are trying to meet their obligations and requiring the IRS to take into account the taxpayer’s
facts and circumstances when deciding whether to accept an OIC).
48
For tax liabilities under $10,000, the IRS will automatically accept an installment agreement. I.R.M.
5.14.1.2(5). The IRS is also required to accept installment agreements from taxpayers who are unable to
pay their tax liability in full, the agreement will result in full payment within three years, and the taxpayer
has not entered into another installment agreement or failed to file tax returns or pay taxes on those returns
in the last five years. See I.R.C. § 6159(c).
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Now, as might be expected in a program that may cost the agency significant
resources, and where future benefits of agreeing to not take enforced collection may be
difficult to gauge, the IRS has done its best following RRA 98 to centralize offer
submissions and considerations in an effort to limit the costs associated with agency
discretion. At the same time, the IRS has promulgated extensive guidance to assist both
itself and taxpayers both with respect to the process of submitting offers and the fairly
complex task of determining a taxpayer’s collection potential.49
Professor Camp implicitly acknowledges the difference between the IRS’s
considerations of alternatives to enforced collection from the rest of the collection
process by noting that even where the IRS does have to make individualized
determinations, its incentives are toward reaching correct decisions. Professor Camp
describes how incentives, absent CDP, provide more than sufficient means of checking
potential IRS abuses and errors:
On the one hand, if the definition of can’t-pay is too narrow, then the IRS pursues
taxpayers who truly cannot pay. Not only does that waste resources but it also
makes the IRS look hard and mean, thereby undermining confidence in
government and leaving the citizenry—and ultimately democracy—vulnerable to
charlatans and demagogues. On the other hand, if the definition is too broad, the
IRS looks like a chump and those who have paid their taxes wonder why the
hammer never falls on similarly situated taxpayers who shirked their
responsibility. Error in either direction weakens voluntary compliance, which
depends in no small measure on perception.50
Yet individualized IRS determinations about these collection alternatives constitute
confidential tax return information,51 and are not subject to disclosure and are thus
generally not made available to other taxpayers. It is difficult to see how the public
49

In addition to OICs based on doubt as to collectability, the IRS is authorized to accept OICs based on
effective tax administration and doubt as to liability. See I.R.C. § 7122 (2000) (granting authority to set
procedures to accept OICs); Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (2002) (outlining those procedures).
50
Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 30.
51
See 5 U.S.C. § 552A(b) (2000).
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genuinely becomes aware of IRS decisions, except only in the context of generalized
perception of IRS performance.
Professor Camp also states that limited review tied to the record “undermines the
promise of CDP.” Yet, a consideration of some of the recent cases where the court have
remanded back to the IRS determinations with respect to collection alternatives
highlights the important safety valve that CDP’s court review can play, and how in fact
CDP’s limited review has served its intended oversight function of limited aspects of the
collection process, has corrected for egregious agency error, and allowed for the court to
highlight errors in the IRS’s consideration of collection alternatives that might have
broader impact than the taxpayer whose case is on appeal. While Professor Camp
discounts record review as being second best to de novo review, administrative law
scholars have long pointed to the benefits of this limited review when it is important to
both give the agency broad deference, but not afford the agency unbridled and absolute
discretion.52 That taxpayers themselves control most of the information relating to their
ability to pay an assessed liability tempers Professor Camp’s criticism that record review
is inadequate, and belies the potential for facilitating confidence in the tax system
through ensuring that government agents “remain subject to the rule of law.”53
Professor Camp highlights the overwhelming percentage of cases which the
courts have sustained IRS collection determinations. Apart from the fact that most agency
determinations under an abuse of discretion review are likely to be sustained54, there are a

52

See Davis, supra note 27, at § 12:13 (indicating that de novo review provides little opportunity for
judicial pressure on the IRS to conform to procedural requirements); Koch, supra note 5, at 491-95
(explaining the benefits of limited review for different types of discretion that the agency practices).
53
Levin, supra note 12, at 742.
54
See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 679,
689 (2002) (hypothesizing an 85-90% affirmance rate for abuse of discretion review cases).
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growing number of important CDP cases where the courts have found problems with the
collection process.55 Prior to CDP, these cases would never have been before the courts.
Consider the case of Oman v. Commissioner.56 Oman involves a one-time business
executive who for a number of years filed tax returns with significant unpaid balances.57
By 2004, his outstanding tax liabilities approached $170,000.58 After completing
rehabilitation to overcome substance abuse addiction, while unemployed, living with
friends, and relying on gifts from family, he submitted a $1000 offer based upon doubt as
to collectibility.59 His collection information sheet that accompanied his offer indicated
that he had no assets and a negative monthly cash flow; thus the $1,000 offer exceeded
his RCP.60
The IRS acknowledged that Oman’s RCP was zero, but rejected Oman’s offer
because of his “egregious history of past non-compliance” and a belief that due to
“current finances” it did not think he would remain in compliance during the offer’s
terms.61 Prior to the initial IRS rejection of the offer, the IRS filed a Notice of Federal
Tax Lien, and issued a corresponding right to a collection due process hearing.62 Oman
submitted a request for a due process hearing, and was able to use the hearing as a forum
to challenge the initial IRS rejection of the offer.63 At the hearing, the Appeals Office
sustained the offer’s rejection, and in its determination it cited to IRM 5.8.7.6(5) and held

55

See infra note 77.
T.C. Memo 2006-231 (2006).
57
There were 8 years in total that gave rise to the liability. For the earliest year, Oman failed to file an
original tax return; in four years, he filed untimely and also did not submit sufficient payment; and in the
final three years, Oman filed timely but did not remit payment of the balances due. Id. at 2.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 3.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 3-4.
62
Id. at 4.
63
Id. at 6.
56
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that due to “your egregious history of noncompliance it is in the best interest of the
government not to accept your offer to compromise.”64
The Tax Court appropriately reviewed Appeals’ rejection on a deferential basis,
noting that it does not conduct an independent review of what would be an acceptable
offer, but gives deference to the Commissioner’s discretion and decides whether the
rejection was arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in law.65 Thus, Oman presented
the issue as to whether and on what basis the IRS can reject offers that exceed the
taxpayer’s RCP.
The Oman Court examined IRS guidance in its internal revenue manual to clarify
when it might be in the government’s interest to reject an offer that exceeded what the
government could reasonably expect to collect.66 It looked to the IRS’s own policy
statement on offers, IRS Policy Statement P-5-100, which provides that the goals of the
offer program are (1) collecting what can fairly and reasonably be collected from
taxpayers who cannot fully pay a delinquent liability, (2) collecting tax in a timely and
cost-effective manner, and (3) providing an opportunity for taxpayers to earn a fresh start
toward future payment and filing obligations.67 The Policy Statement also states that the
“ultimate goal is a compromise which is in the best interest of both the taxpayer and the
Service.”68

64

Id.
Id. at 9.
66
Id. at 10-11.
67
Id. at 13.
68
The policy statement also provides guidance on the process of offer, noting that “in cases where an offer
in compromise appears to be a viable solution to a tax delinquency, the Service employee assigned the case
will discuss the compromise alternative with the taxpayer and, when necessary, assist in preparing the
required forms. The taxpayer will be responsible for initiating the first specific proposal for compromise…
Taxpayers are expected to provide reasonable documentation to verify their ability to pay.” This guidance
reflects a sense that the IRS should both facilitate and assist in the offer process, while recognizing the
65

16

The IRS, in IRM 5.8.7.6(5), has provided that there may be instances where an
offer rejection may also be based on a determination that accepting the offer at hand is
not in the "best interest of the government" per policy statement P-5-100.69 The IRM
provides that these rejections "should not be routine" and should be "fully supported by
the facts outlined in the rejection narrative" and subject to "additional managerial
review."70 The IRM provides examples of situations that may warrant rejection as not
being in the "best interest of the government," including:
Recent compliance satisfies offer processability criteria; however, the taxpayer
has an egregious history of past noncompliance and our analysis of his current
finances reveals that it will be highly unlikely the taxpayer will be able to remain
in compliance during the offer period.71
Thus, while the IRS’s Policy Statement focuses on collecting efficiently what a taxpayer
can reasonably be expected to pay and the benefits of providing a fresh start, the IRM
suggests that past egregious noncompliance and the likelihood of future noncompliance
can create a situation where the IRS may reject an offer in excess of RCP.
Oman concluded that these two provisions were inconsistent, noting that the
Policy Statement offered nothing that suggested that past compliance or the likelihood of
future compliance should affect the agency’s evaluation of an offer:
IRM sec. 5.8.7.6(5) and policy statement P-5-100, as applied in this case, appear
to be inconsistent regarding the "best interest of the government". IRM sec.
5.8.7.6(5) pertains to rejecting offers if they are "not in the 'best interest of the
government', per policy statement P-5-100", while policy statement P-5-100
describes the dollar amount of offers which are in the "best interest" of the
government and encourages such compromises. The "goal" of the offer- incompromise program, according to policy statement P-5-100, is to collect what is
potentially collectible as early as possible, and the "ultimate goal" is to find a
taxpayer’s responsibility for making an initial offer and providing to the IRS information sufficient to make
a determination. Id. at 12.
69
Id. at 10-11.
70
Id. at 10-11.
71
Id. at 15-16.
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compromise that is in the "best interest of both the taxpayer and the Service."
Policy statement P-5-100 does not mention "egregious past non-compliance". It
instead mentions "creating for the taxpayer an expectation of a fresh start toward
future compliance.”
According to policy statement P-5-100, it appears the "best interest of the
government" is a compromise that is also in the best interest of the taxpayer and
which collects the potentially collectible amount, or more, at the earliest possible
time.72
In light of the above, the Oman court found it difficult to justify the IRS’s rejection of the
offer, noting (i) that the IRS “determined that petitioner's reasonable collection potential
was zero” (ii) that under the Policy Statement acceptance of the $ 1,000 offer is in the
IRS’s and the taxpayer’s “best interest”; and (iii) that acceptance permits the IRS to
collect more than it could otherwise collect and allow "a fresh start toward future
compliance."73
Oman illustrates the possible problems with the IRS’s collection system, and how,
absent CDP, those problems can lead to arbitrary determinations for taxpayers. There is
something deeply dissatisfying about the IRS’s approach in Oman specifically, and the
guidelines which allowed the IRS to reject the offer. On the one hand, there are a number
of reasons why the IRS might find it difficult to accept Oman’s offer. First, the offer
itself is low relative to the amount of tax that was unpaid. The $1000 offer reflects a
small percentage of the unpaid tax. That, however, as described above, is an insufficient
basis to reject an offer.74
The IRS in the IRM and in Oman’s itself does explicitly consider the circumstances
of that past conduct and evaluate whether those circumstances warrant an exception to
the general rule that the IRS should accept doubt as to collectability offers when the offer
72

Id. at 13-14.
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equals or exceeds RCP. Yet, there is little guidance for the IRS on this very point; the
regulations are silent and the IRM provides a few examples, without any discussion of
the underlying principles that should guide the IRS. In Oman, it is not clear just what
about his history the IRS found egregious. Perhaps it was the combination of his
relatively high income with many years of making barely any tax payments. It could
have been what he apparently was doing with Uncle Sam’s money, as the opinion notes
that during the years where he failed to pay taxes he had substance abuse problems.75 It
could be that the liabilities relate to underpayments or nonpayments, rather than liabilities
that arose on examination.76
Concepts of “best interests of the government” or “contrary to public policy” are
too vague to allow a reviewing court the opportunity to determine if the IRS abused its
discretion. In effect, in Oman, the IRS operated as if its discretion were absolute, and
that its decision need not be rationally explained or tied to principles that provide
meaningful guidance to its employees. Oman can thus be thought of as the Tax Court’s
proper entry into this issue, with a firm reminder that OICs, at least when challenged in
the context of CDP, are subject to typical rule of law principles. The IRS cannot reject
offers because they flunk a smell test, or because the taxpayer has red hair, or because of
some secret IRS policy that encourages rejection of low offers. Oman lays down the
marker that the IRS better clarify in either its manual or in regulations what principles
underlie rejecting offers that exceed RCP, and in particular determinations, Appeals must
explain specifically how the taxpayers’ circumstances warrant that determination. It
illustrates precisely why Congress thought collection determinations may need the benefit
75

See Dissipation case, where the court
For example, there is less generous opportunity for relief from joint and several liability when the
liability is self-reported. IRC Section 6015.
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of judicial oversight, and fits squarely within the concerns that a number of
administrative law scholars have suggested as providing a strong presumption against
unbridled agency discretion.
While Professor Camp rightly points out that the overwhelming number of CDP
cases result in affirmations of IRS collection actions, there are a number of recent cases,
in addition to Oman, involving remands where IRS failed to apply proper legal
standards.77 Administrative law scholars have emphasized that limited record review
results in comparatively few cases of court reversal of agency action. Yet, absent CDP,
there is no realistic manner for taxpayers to ensure scrutiny of IRS collection actions.
Professor Camp believes this limited court review is “horrid,” and points to some
examples where courts have been hamstrung by inadequate records and notes the
relatively few times where courts have meaningfully disagreed with agency
determinations.78 Yet, as I have previously argued, record review is precisely the
appropriate level of review when one wants to give broad deference to agency expertise,
there is a strong government interest in executive agency discretion, and yet there is a
need to have a means to check the agency’s absolute discretion to temper for systemic
77

See Sampson v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Opinion 2006-75 (2006) (incorrect standard when calculating a
taxpayer’s earning potential); Samuel v. Comm’r T.C. Memo 2007-312 (2007) (incorrect guidance given to
taxpayer for amended OIC); Perkins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2008-103 (2008) (erroneous interpretation of
applicable law); Dailey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2008-148 (2008) (incomplete consideration of an OIC).
Each of these cases highlights the importance of CDP in different ways. Sampson’s application of an
incorrect standard helps illustrate the point that unchecked internal review can fail to properly identify
diversions from the IRS’s own guidelines – in this case the IRM. Dailey shows how external review
protects taxpayers from incomplete consideration of their situation, and requires IRS officers to conduct a
complete and thorough review of the appropriate factors. Similarly, Samuel identifies factors that must be
taken into account when advising a taxpayer on their course of action. Perkins, though, is probably the best
illustration of CDP’s effectiveness. In this case, the court was able to tackle the issue of mistaken
interpretation of law – an issue typically reviewed de novo. Perkins is also a terrific example of how
external review should be conducted. The court took over the legal question involved (statutory
interpretation), but left to the IRS the responsibility of applying that legal determination to a particular set
of facts, actually going out of its way not to step on the toes of the IRS by making its own factual
determination.
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Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1 at 55, 57-61.
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failures or egregious errors. The promise of oversight from parties other than courts
provides only limited means of ensuring that IRS collection actions involve correct
applications or expressions of legal principles
The fact that other mechanisms exist to provide oversight79 does not suggest that
court review is inappropriate. The existence of bodies such as TIGTA, GAO, and the
Taxpayer Advocate Service, to name a few, are helpful mechanisms to facilitate proper
agency conduct. Those executive agency checks, however, are not a substitute for
independent judicial review, with judicial expertise playing a different and invaluable
role.80
Professor Camp notes that Congress might provide for individualized causes of
action with respect to IRS rejections of collection alternatives.81 The number of collection
alternative requests that the IRS rejects is likely considerably lower than the number of
collection actions now that currently gives rise to CDP rights. This is a proposal that
warrants further consideration. I note that Congress, over time, has provided
circumstances where the agency is required to accept certain collection alternatives, and
the IRS has in fact broadened the circumstances where it will grant that relief. This too
could limit the potential agency and court resources, and correct for the oddity that only
adverse collection determinations within current CDP generate possible court review.

III. CONCLUSION
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Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at.
See supra note 1.
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Professor Camp states that a narrowly tailored cause of action where a taxpayer can challenge the
rejection of a collection alternative would “at least put an individualized decision in front of a court.” Id. at
70 n.183.
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Professor Camp is one of a handful of scholars meaningfully considering the
appropriate role that the IRS, courts and Congress should play in the collection process.
His article highlights a number of CDP’s problems. This response is not intended to
belittle some of those problems, nor offer the view that CDP is perfect. Yet, Professor
Camp’s descriptive and prescriptive approaches I believe are incomplete. They miss the
essential protections that interjecting additional procedural protections in the collection
process provide. Despite its shortfalls, his article is a significant achievement and helps
situate the discussion about the appropriate roles that our branches of government should
play in the crucial task of collecting the revenues that are our nation’s lifeblood.
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